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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A.

Nature of the Case.

This appeal arises out of a "Petition for Judicial Review" filed by Respondents Neighbors
for Responsible Growth, et al. (hereafter "Neighbors") pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act
(LLUPA), Idaho Code §67-6521. R., Vol. I, p. 3. 1 Neighbors initially sought review of a November
9, 2006 Order of Decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereafter "the Board").

R., Vol. I, p. 2. Petitioners later sought to expand their Petition for Judicial Review to encompass
the Board's subsequent "Order of Decision" of November 16, 2006. R., Vol. I, p. 19.
Neighbors sought to challenge the Board's amendment to Kootenai County's Comprehensive
Plan. The requested amendment related to an area generally described in the administrative
proceedings below as "the Powderhom Peninsula." There is no actual or specific legal description
of property constituting "the Powderhom Peninsula." In administrative proceedings, the property
was generally considered to include approximately 3,000 acres of land, in Kootenai County,
consisting of approximately 186 separate parcels. Agency R., Vol. I, pp. 20-23, 131, 141-152.
Owners of properties included within the administrative concept of the Powderhom Peninsula, and
affected by the Board's decisions for which review was sought, included Appellants Magnuson

.

(owners of approximately four hundred seventy (4 70) of the Powderhom Peninsula acres); Bia Bar,

Appellants H.F. Magnuson and Coeurd' Alene Land Company (collectively referred
to herein as "Appellants Magnuson") adopt the form of record citation set forth by Appellants
Powderhom in their Opening Brief. Specifically, the Agency Record (as to proceedings held before
Kootenai County) and the Agency Transcripts (reflecting proceedings held before Kootenai County),
both lodged with the District Court, will be cited as the "Agency Record" and "Agency Transcript,"
respectively. The Clerk's Record from proceedings before the District Court will be referred to by
the acronym "R., Vol. ___ , p. _ _ _ . " The transcript of proceedings before the District Court
will be referred to by the acronym "Tr., Vol. _ _, p. ___ "

I

Inc. and Charles R. Blakeley (219 acres); and Eastpoint Farms, Inc. (533 acres). Agency R., Vol.
I, pp. 30, 62, 64. Ownership also included Powderhom Communities, LLC. Id.
Appellant Heartland, LLC, as agent for the noted owners, requested that the County amend
its Comprehensive Plan in three respects, all based upon substantial changes in the actual conditions
existing on Powderhom Peninsula.' The three proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan,
with respect to the Powderhom Peninsula, were described by Appellant Powderhom at p. 7 of its
Opening Brief In general terms, based upon changes in agricultural and timber practices, Heartland
ultimately proposed to amend the Comprehensive Plan to change various designations (Agricultural
and Timber) to Rural. Agency R., Vol. I, p. 57; Vol. 2, pp. 240-255, 388-393.
Respondent Neighbors, an unincorporated association essentially opposed to any and all
development, and whose members include no one owning any property on the Powderhom
Peninsula, objected in administrative proceedings before the County. The requested amendments
were approved and authorized by the County Board following multiple transparent public hearings.
Dissatisfied, the Neighbors Respondents petitioned for judicial review in the District Court.

It is important to note what this appeal is not about. This appeal does not involve a
substantive challenge to the merits of the Board's Decision. Indeed, the District Court noted:
if considering other issues raised by the party solely under the restrained level of
judicial review, it would appear to the Court that a reviewing court would properly
defer to the Board's Decision.
R., Vol. III, p. 600. Rather, this appeal involves issues that relate to the District Court's subject

2

In order to amend the Comprehensive Plan, it was necessary to show a "substantial
change ... in the actual conditions in the area that justifies an amendment." Agency R., Vol. 2, p.
310. Kootenai County Resolution No. 95-03 authorizes an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan
"to recognize substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area."
2

matter jurisdiction (to review a legislative determination of the County Board) and various
specifically-noted fatal procedural infirmities arising out of the. method and manner by which
Neighbors chose to proq;ed before the District Court.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

Administrative Proceedings.

On December 16, 2005, Appellants Powderhorn and Heartland (collectively referred to herein
as "Powderhorn") filed an application, including the property of Appellants Magnuson, requesting
that Kootenai County amend its Comprehensive Plan insofar as the same pertained to a general
geographic area known as The PowderhornPeninsula. _AgencyR., Vol. I, p. 57; Vol. 2,pp.299-310.
The changes then generally sought were to amend the Comprehensive Plan's designation of specific
Agriculture and Timber land to Rural Residential.
On April 27, 2006, the Kootenai County Planning Commission held a public hearing on the
Powderhorn application. Agency Supp. Tr., Vol. !, pp. 1-89. On May 25, 2006, the Planning
Commission deliberated. Agency R., Vol. 3, pp. 596-572. The Commission determined to
recommend that the Powderhorn application be denied for and on the basis that the Commission
desired to wait until the completion of the rewrite of the County's Comprehensive Plan. Agency Tr.,
Vol. 1, pp. 1-17; Agency R., Vol. 3, pp. 569-572. 3
On August 14, 2006, Powderhorn requested a substantive revision to the Powderhorn
application. Agency R., Vol. 1, pp. 20-28. Powderhorn changed its request to seek a Rural
designation as opposed to a Rural Residential designation. Id.

3

As of the writing of this Brief; nearly two years later, the Comprehensive Plan rewrite
is still in progress with no approval date on the horizon.
3

On September 14, 2006, the Board conducted a lengthy public hearing on the Powderhom
application as amended. Agency Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 19-104. Following the hearing, the Board resolved
to conduct a site visit to the Powderhom Peninsula. Agency Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 106-201. That visit
occurred on September 25, 2006. Id.
On September 26, 2006, Neighbors filed an objection to certain conduct observed during the
site visit. Essentially, Neighbors accused one of Kootenai County's Commissioners of having
improper ex parte communication, during the site visit, with a Powderhom representative. Agency
R., Vol. 2, pp. 367-374.
On September 28, 2006, in response to the objection ofNeighbors, the Board reopened public
testimony and set a second public hearing for October 4, 2006. Agency Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 204-209.
As scheduled, a second public hearing was held on October 4, 2006, with no time or submittal
limitations placed upon Neighbors' representatives. Agency Tr., Vol. 1., pp. 221-227.
On October 5, 2006, following the above-described public hearings, the Board deliberated.
Agency R., Vol. 3, p. 6 l 8; Agency Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 229-234. Following deliberations, on November
9, 2006, the Board entered its Initial Order, amending the Comprehensive Plan designation of the
Powderhom Peninsula to Rural. Agency R., Vol. 3, pp. 604-614; Agency Tr., Vol. 1, p. 238.
Evidencing the legislative nature of the Board's action, the Board contemporaneously passed
Resolution No. 2006-92, adopting the new Comprehensive Plan designation, and providing general
notice of the new Countywide legislation to the citizens of Kootenai County by publishing a Legal
Notice. Agency R., Vol. 1, pp. 100-104. 4 On November 16, 2006, the Board modified its Initial

4

It is this Initial Order of November 9, 2006 from which Neighbors petitioned for
review. R., Vol. I, p. 002.
4

Order and entered its Final Order. Agency R., Vol. 3, pp. 591-600. The Board's November 16, 2006
Order of Decision constituted its Final Order.'

2.

Proceedings Before the District Court.

Following entry of the Board's Initial Order of November 9, 2006 (Agency R., Vol. 3, pp.
604-614), Neighbors filed their "Petition for Judicial Review." R., Vol. I, pp. 1-19. The Petition
specifically sought review from the Board's November 9, 2006 Initial Order. R., Vol. I, p. 002.
Review was sought pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA), LC. §67-5201,
et seq. 6 In addition to its appeal under IDAPA, Neighbors asserted two questionable causes of action
("Unlawful Ex Parte Communications" and "Conflict oflnterest"), for which no supporting statutory
or case law was cited so as to allow the joinder of said claims (to the extent cognizable at law) in an
appellate proceeding under IDAPA.
Neighbors' "Petition for Review" identified as interested parties only Kootenai County. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 1-4. Neighbors did not identify as interested parties the Powderhom Appellants or the
Magnuson Appellants. Powderhorn neither served these Appellants nor filed proof of service
regarding the same.

No timely appeal was ever taken from the Board's Final Order ofNovember 16, 2006,
the dispositive order, by Neighbors.
6

Neighbors argued that the Board's Interim Order of November 9, 2006 was in
violation of LC. §67-5279(3) on the following bases:
(1)

It was entered upon unlawful procedure;

(2)

It was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and/or

(3)

It was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

R., Vol. I, pp. 14-15.
5

Shortly thereafter, on December 8, 2006, in the absence of service on Appellants Powderhom
or Magnuson, or any representative for said Appellants, Neighbors moved the Court for a stay of any
further public hearings by or on behalf of Appellants with respect to any request to rezone their
portions of the Powderhom Peninsula in a manner consistent with the Board's November 9, 2006
Interim Order. R., Vol. I, pp. 27-28. As with its original Petition for Review, Neighbors did not
,

serve the motion on Appellants Powderhom or Magnuson or any agent or representative for said
Appellants. Id.
Powderhom informally learned of Neighborhoods' pending Petition and Motion to Stay
seven days before the then-scheduled hearing. See Appellant Powderhom's Opening Brief at p. 10.
Appellants Powderhom immediately moved to intervene. R., Vol. I, pp. 41-43. Appellants
Powderhorn also argued that no stay should be granted absent the posting of adequate security as
required by IRCP 84(m). 7
On December 19, 2006, the District Court granted the Powderhom Appellants' Motion to
Intervene. R., Vol. I, pp. 93-95. Over the objection of the Powderhorn Appellants, the District Court
contemporaneously granted Neighbors' "Motion to Stay." Id. The District Court did not require that
Neighbors, as the party seeking the stay pending appeal, post any form of security. Id.
The Powderhorn Appellants thereafter moved the District Court to dismiss Neighbors'
November 15, 2006 Petition for Review (R., Vol. I, pp. 1-19) on the bases that:
(1)

The District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an appellate review of a
legislative act of the County Board;

7

In support of its opposition, Powderhom submitted affidavit testimony that a stay
would cause it $30,000 in unreoccurring expenses and $20,000 per month in reoccurring carrying
costs. R., Vol. I, p. 54.
6

(2)

Neighbors had failed to timely appeal from the Board's Final Order of
November 16, 2006 (i.e., within the twenty-eight (28) day period mandated
by LC. §67-5273(3)); and

(3)

That the proceeding was moot (based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and Neighbors' failure to timely appeal from the dispositive order).

R., Vol. I, pp. 100-118.

It should be noted at this juncture that Neighbors' original "Petition for Judicial Review,"
filed November 15, 2006, joined with the administrative appeal (under IDAPA) two independent
causes of action (denominated "Unlawful Ex Parte Contact" and "Conflict of Iuterest").
Accordingly, uuder IRCP 15, the Petition could not be unilaterally amended once it had been joined
with a responsive pleading. Powderhorn responded through a Motion to Dismiss under IRCP 12.
Through the Powderhorn Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the Neighbors Respondents were
made aware that they had failed to timely appeal from the Board's dispositive order (i.e., the Order
of November 16, 2006). R., Vol. I., p. 106. On February 5, 2007, Neighbors responded by filing
an "Amended Petition for Judicial Review." R., Vol. I, pp. 119-139. Neighbors' attempted
Amended Petition differed from its predecessor in two respects. First, the Amended Petition sought
review of the Board's November 16, 2006 Final Order. Id. Second, the Amended Petition attempted
to insert into an appeal under IDAP A a third independent cause of action denominated as one arising
under the Idaho Declaratory Judgments Act, LC. §10-1201, et seq. R., Vol. I, pp. 136-138.
The Magnuson Appellants, who were neither named as interested parties in the original
Petition for Review or the Amended Petition for Review, and who were never served with either
pleading, moved to intervene. R., Vol. I, pp. 255-257. The motion was thereafter granted. R., Vol.
I, pp. 300-302.

7

The Powderhom Appellants then formally objected to Neighbors' attempted "Amended
Petition for Review," and contemporaneously moved to strike the same. R., Vol. I, pp. 280-282.
The Powderhorn Appellants claimed that Neighbors could not amend its Petition for Review absent
Powderhom' s consent (which was not provided) or an order entered following a motion under IRCP
15. Id.
On April 9, 2007, Neighbors responded by filing an "Alternative Motion for Leave to
Amend," seeking leave of the Court, pursuant to IRCP 15(a), to file the Amended Petition for
Review that Neighbors had unilaterally attempted to file some two months earlier. R., Vol. II, pp.
344-346. The Powderhorn Appellants objected to Neighbors' "Alternative Motion for Leave to
Amend Petition for Judicial Review." R., Vol. III, pp. 444-446.
The Magnuson Appellants joined in the Powderhom Appellants' objection to Neighbors'
"Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Review."

R., Vol. III, pp. 459-461.

Powderhorn and Magnuson asserted that Neighbors sought leave to appeal from the November 16,
2006 final Board Order of Decision, pursuant to IRCP 84(b) and LC. §§67-5273 and 67-6521,
notwithstanding the fact that the time for so doing had passed. Powderhorn and Magnuson further
argued that Neighbors could not avail themselves ofIRCP 15 to revive a claim that was time-barred
or to add a declaratory relief claim (a claim within the District Court's original jurisdiction) since
Neighbors' Petition had invoked the District Court's appellate jurisdiction under IDAPA. 8

8

The Magnuson Appellants argued that the two types of proceedings (an appellate
proceeding under IDAP A versus an original proceeding under the Idaho Declaratory Judgments Act,
LC. §10-1201, et seq.) were procedurally different and thatjoinder of the same was inappropriate.
By way of example, and not by way of limitation, the Magnuson Appellants argued that IRCP 41
precluded a party from disqualifying a District Court judge, without cause, while the Court was
sitting in an appellate capacity. On the other hand, the limitation of Rule 41 does not apply to
instances involving claims for declaratory relief. The incongruity of adding the two claims into one
8

With the previously-described motions (other than the motions to intervene) unresolved, all
parties (Neighbors, Powderhorn, Magnuson, and Kootenai County) filed theirrespective substantive
briefing on the appellate issues. On May 31, 2007, the Court heard argument regarding Neighbors'
Amended Petition for Judicial Review, the motions ofPowderhorn and Magnuson to strike the same,
and Neighbors' alternative Motion for Leave to Amend its original Petition for Judicial Review
(through the Amended Petition for Judicial Review). The District Court determined that Neighbors
could amend its original Petition for Judicial Review without the necessity of a motion under IRCP
15 and that the Amended Petition for Judicial Review could challenge the propriety of the November
16, 2006 final Board Order of Decision even though the Amended Petition was filed more than
twenty-eight (28) days after the decision had been rendered. Tr., p. 144.
On June 5, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the merits of the appeal. At hearing, the
Court, on its own initiative, raised an issue as to the applicability ofidaho Code §67-6509. Tr., p.
165. The argument had never been raised, asserted, plead, or argued by Neighbors.
Following post-hearing briefing, the District Court entered its July 25, 2007 Memorandum
Decision. R., Vol. III, pp. 590-606. The District Court determined, inter alia, as follows:
(1)

"The Board Decision was an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, and any
question of judicial review is to be considered in that context";

(2)

Legislative acts of the Board are outside the scope of the District Court's
Appellate jurisdiction;

(3)

Whether or not the amendment of the Comprehensive Plan was legislative,
the procedural propriety of the amendment could be challeni,;ed through a
declaratory judgment action;

proceeding, with different evidentiary standards (the heightened standard ofreview under IDAPA
. versus the preponderance standard in an original proceeding), and different procedural rules (see,
~ , IRCP 41), supported denial of Neighbors' Alternative Motion to Amend.
9

(4)

Since Neighbors had joined a declaratory judgment claim with their Petition
for Review under IDAP A, "the jurisdictional issue" was moot;

(5)

"Assuming there is a lack of jurisdiction to reach a question of unlawful
procedure pursuant to power of judicial review of agency action, a court
could simply make the same decision under the rubric of a declaratory
judgment action;" and

(6)

The process followed by the Board was deemed to violate LC. §67-6509(b)
as interpreted by Price v. Payette Count¼ 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583
(1998).

R., Vol. III, pp. 590-602. The District Court ordered that the matter be remanded for proceedings
consistent with the Court's Decision. Id.
The District Court so ruled notwithstanding the objections ofthe Powderhom and Magnuson
Appellants, including the objection that it was procedurally improper, under the facts at bar, to
resolve an issue through a claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act that had been joined with a
Petition for Review under IDAP A. The two proceedings differ in terms of evidentiary standards and
procedure. Perhaps more significantly, a claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act is an original
claim which must be brought and perfected in accordance with the terms of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The method and manner by which the District Court ruled resulted in the entry of a
declaratory judgment affecting the rights of all owners ofproperty within the Powderhom Peninsula,
not just Powderhom and Magnuson. No owner of property within the Powderhom Peninsula
objected to the requested amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The only parties that objected
were the Neighbors Respondents (who do not own property subject to the amendment). By deciding
as it did, the District Court entered a declaratory judgment that bound non-parties to a decision
rendered in a proceeding in which they were neither named nor served.

10

On August 15, 2007, the District Court entered its Judgment consistent with its Memorandum
Opinion. R., Vol. III, pp. 603-606. An Amended Judgment was thereafter entered. on August 29,
2007. R., Vol. III, pp. 614-617. On August 31, 2007, Powderhom filed its Notice of Appeal. R.,
Vol. III, pp. 618-627. On September 4, 2007, the Magnuson Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal.
R., Vol. III, pp. 628-637.

C.

Statement of Facts.

The Magnuson Appellants concur with the Powderhom Appellants that the relevant facts
associated with this appeal are largely procedural in nature. To that end, Appellants Magnuson
would respectfully refer the Court to the "Course of Proceedings" section set forth above. In
addition, the Powderhom Appellants have more than amply set forth an accurate recitation of the
facts giving rise to this appeal in their Opening Brief. See Appellant Powderhom's Opening Brief
at pp. 6-12. The cited "Statement of Facts," advanced by Appellants Powderhom, is incorporated
herein as though set forth in full and will not be repeated.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
Appellants Magnuson reassert and advance issues one through five as previously advanced

by the Powderhom Appellants in their Opening Brief:
(1)

Whether the Board's Final Order is an appealable agency action pursuant to the Local
Land Use Planning Act.
(i)

Whether Neighbors is an "affected person" under the Local Land Use
Planning Act.

(ii)

Whether the Board's Final Order was Legislative or Quasi-Judicial.

(iii)

Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation and application of Price
v. Payette County Board of County Commissioners.

11

(2)

Whether Neighbors timely appealed the Board's Final Order.

(3)

Whether the District Court erred in allowing Neighbors to amend its Petition for
Judicial Review to seek review of the Board's Final Order.

(4)

Whether the District Court erred in vacating and remanding the Board's Final Order
amending the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5279.
(i)

(ii)

(5)

Whether the Board's Final Order violated any of the subsections contained
in Idaho Code §67-5279(3).
(a)

The issue ofcompliance with Idaho Code §67-6509 should not have
been addressed on appeal to the District Court since it was not raised
before the Board.

(b)

The Board complied with all the requirements of Idaho Code §676509(b).

Whether the Board's Final Order prejudiced any of Neighbors' substantial
rights pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5279(4).

Whether the District Court erred in imposing a stay upon Appellants' zone change
applications without implementing a bond or any appropriate terms.

See Powderhom Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 12-13.
In addition, the Magnuson Appellants advance as additional issues the following:

III.

(6)

Whether the District Court's ruling, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
LC. §10-1201, et seq., violates substantive and procedural due process.

(7)

Whether Appellants Magnuson are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

ARGUMENT.
A.

Standard of Review.

This Court recently set forth a summary of the standards applicable to this appeal:

In an appeal from a District Court, where the Court was acting in its appellate
capacity under IDAP A, the Supreme Court reviews the Agency Record independently
of the District Court's Decision. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners ofFreemont
12

County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). As to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the zoning decision. Id. The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long
as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Payette River Property
Owners Assoc. v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 554,
976 P.2d 477,480 (1999). Planning and Zoning decisions are entitled to a strong
presumption of validity, including a Board's application and interpretation ofits own
zoning ordinance. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254.
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedures; (d) not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. LC. §67-5279(2); Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254. The party
attacking a zoning board's action must first illustrate that the board erred in a manner
specified therein and then must show that a substantial right of the party has been
prejudiced. Id.
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 2008 Opinion No. 34 (March 6, 2008) at p. 4.
B.

The Board's Final Order of November 16, 2006 Was Not an Appealable Agency
Action Subject to Judicial Review Pursuantto the Local Land Use Planning Act
or the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.

1.

There is No Statutory Right for Direct Appellate Review of a County's
Amendment to its Comprehensive Plan.

The provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act(LC. § 67-6501 et seq.) make clear that
a county board's adoption and subsequent amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative
matter. The Act further makes clear that there is no right to seek direct judicial review, through the
appellate process, of such a legislative determination.
Section 67-6508 authorizes counties to develop Comprehensive Plans applicable to all land
within the given county's jurisdiction. See LC.§ 67-6508. Such a Plan is to "consider previous and
existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations" for each
13

applicable planning component. Id. The adoption of a Plan, by a county's governing board, must be
byresolutiqn and is in and of itself a legislative act. See LC. § 67-6509(b). See also Gumprecht v.
City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983). Such a plan, once adopted, may be
amended upon proper notice and hearing. See LC. § 67-6509(a). As with the initial adoption of a
Comprehensive Plan, the subsequent amendment thereof is equally a legislative act. A plan or part
of a plan may only be amended by resolution. See LC. § 67-6509(c).
The Local Land Use Planning Act makes plear that one who claims to be aggrieved by a
county board's adoption of a resolution to amend a portion of a Comprehensive Plan may not seek
direct judicial appellate review. LC. § 67-6521 provides for direct judicial review under the Act, but
that right to review is limited to determinations related to "the issuance or denial of a permit
authorizing ... development." See LC.§ 67-652l(l)(a). There has been no decision by the County
either issuing or denying a permit so as to allow development on any of the property encompassed
by the amendment adopted by the Initial Order or the Final Order. Indeed, any such further action
was stayed by the District Court. Only those persons claiming to be adversely affected by the
"issuance or denial of a permit authorizing ... development," as opposed to persons claiming to be
adversely affected from a legislative determination to amend a Comprehensive Plan, may seek
judicial review. Even so, those seekingjudicial review must do so within twenty-eight (28) days after
entry of the challenged Order.

2.

Idaho Case Law Makes Clear that the Act of Amending A
Comprehensive Plan is A Legislative Act.

The Local Land Use Planning Act was first adopted in 1975. Every appellate decision that
has subsequently addressed the issue, whether directly or inferentially, has held that the adoption or
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amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative act. For example, in Gumprecht v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983), this Court was called upon to determine
"whether local zoning ordinances may be ... amended in Idaho through an initiative election."
Gumprecht, I 04 Idaho at 616. The Court rejected the contention that a local zoning ordinance could
be amended through the initiative process. In so doing, the Court commented at length upon the
nature ofidaho's local (county) zoning power and its legislative basis.
"The power of counties ... to zone is a police power authorized by
Article 12, Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution .... " Article 12,
Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution provides:
LOCAL POLICE REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED- Any county ... may make and enforce, within its
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or
with the general laws.

In 1975, the Idaho Legislature adopted a comprehensive
recodification and revision of the laws of the State relating to
planning and zoning, in the Local Planning Act of 1975. See, I.C. §§
67-6501 et seq. .... Exercise of the authority to zone and plan,
whether by governing board or by the established commissions, is
made mandatory by LC. § 67-6503.

Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to legislative intent and
purpose .... The Legislature clearly intended that the authority to
enact comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts and adopt
amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by City and County
legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed
procedures .... "
Gumprecht, I 04 Idaho at 6 I 7- I 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Burt v. City ofidaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1073 (1983), decided three months
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after Gumprecht, the Court conclusively resolved the issue at bar. The City Council ofldaho Falls,
after conducting hearings and other required procedures, amended its Comprehensive Plan.
Following said amendment, the City annexed certain property, zoning the same consistent with the
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The plaintiff, John Burt, owned a portion of the annexed
land and filed a Petition for Review in the District Court pursuant to LC. § 67-6521 (the same
statutory authority relied upon by the Petitioners at bar). The Court specifically found the City's
actions to be legislative in nature and that the plaintiff had no right of appellate review from the
same. In so doing, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision that "the questioned activity [was]
legislative and therefore not subject to direct judicial review." Burt v. City ofldabo Falls, 105 Idaho
at 66.
The Court analyzed the issue as follows:
"To determine if the appellant, Burt, has an avenue of appeal from the
decision of the City Council requires an examination of the
provisions of the "Local Planning Act of 1975," Title 67, Chapter 65,
LC., and a determination of whether the questioned activity is
legislative or quasi-judicial. Burt contends that pursuant to LC.§ 676521 that he was entitled to bring an appeal to the District Court. We
disagree.

"[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances
is legislative action." ....

In Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County. supra,
we were faced with determining the procedural due process
requirements necessary to support a rezoning decision. In that case,
the applicants for the rezoning appealed to the District Court from a
denial of their application. We held that the action of the Board of
Commissioners in acting upon a rezoning request was quasi-judicial
in nature. Legislative activity by a zoning entity is differentiated from
guasi-judicial activity by the result - - legislative activity produces a
16

rule or policy which has application to an open class whereas quasijudicial activity impacts specific individuals, interests, or situations
.... Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by "its
high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate
remedy can be had at the polls." ....
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 67-68 (citations omitted) (quoting Cooper v. Board of
County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980)).
The foregoing authorities make clear that the action embodied in the Initial Order and the
Final Order was purely legislative, is not subject to direct judicial review pursuant to LC. § 67-6521,
and is not subject to the provisions ofIRCP 84 (formerly IRCP 83(c)). 9

3.

Consistent With the Local Land Use Planning Act and Idaho Law, the
County Recognized and Appreciated that Its Actions Were Legislative
in Nature.

Kootenai County's attorney acknowledged and advised the County that the amendment to
the Comprehensive Plan was legislative in nature. Tr., Vol. I, p. 114. The Kootenai County Planning
Department recognized that its action was legislative in nature. R., Vol. I, p. 130. The County
Commissioners, in adopting Resolution No. 2006-92, explicitly acknowledged that their action was
legislative in nature and capable of being accomplished only through a resolution. R., Vol. III, pp.
602-03.

9

Accordingly, the stay of further proceedings before the County, as ordered by the District
Court under the authority of LR.C.P. 84(m), was improper. Burt v. Idaho Falls makes clear that
since no direct judicial review may be had from the legislative action at issue, that IRCP 84,
including the stay provisions therein, does not apply. Moreover, even if Rule 84 applied, the
Petitioners wholly-failed to comply therewith. Rule 84(b) requires that Petitions for Judicial Review
be concurrently served upon the agency "and all other parties to the proceeding before the agency
.... " Proof of service on "all parties" shall be filed with the Court in the fonn required byIRCP 5(f).
The District Court enjoined Intervenors Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land Company from pursuing
theirrequested zone change application (Kootenai County Planning Case No. Z-789-06) without any
notice, service, opportunity to be heard, or other due process protections.
17

The Petitioners cannot seriously challenge that neither the Initial Order (from which they
timely appealed) nor the Final Order (from which they did not timely appeal) are anything but
legislative. Apparently, they were dissatisfied that the Commissioners did not wait for a county-wide
Comprehensive Plan update process to be completed, a process which is still incomplete. See
Petition for Judicial Review at ,r 10. Yet at the same time, Petitioners speak out ofboth sides of their
mouths. Specifically, in adopting the amendment, the County Commissioners made a legislative
determination that, with respect to the property encompassed by the amendment, "There has been
substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area to warrant a change in the future land use
designation.... " R., Vol. III, p. 602. The Petitioners acknowledge these substantial changes,
admitting that "rapidly increasing growth and development" has far exceeded "projections at the time
of the adoption of the last Comprehensive Plan in 1994 .... " See Petition for Judicial Review at

,r 11. In other words, Petitioners acknowledge both the significance and the rapidness of the changes
that were relied upon by the County in determining to grant the requested amendment rather than
waiting for the completion of an update with an undetermined delivery date.

4.

The District Court Erroneously Applied This Court's Holding in Price
v. Payette County Board of County Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 958
P.2d 553 (1998).

In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court apparently concluded that it had the
authority, under a claim advanced pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (LC. § 10-1201, et
seg.), to apply its construction of this Court's holding in Price v. Payette County Board of County
Commissioners, supra. If, as posited above, Neighbors had no statutory right of direct appellate
review, aud if the Board's action was legislative, then the District Court had no jurisdiction to
proceed in the context of an appeal under IDAPA. The District Court apparently reasoned that it
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could proceed to rule on the matter since Neighbors had joined in its Petition for Judicial Review
a claim for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act. This was error.
A claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act is a claim within the District Court's original
(as opposed to appellate) jurisdiction. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed so as
to assure and protect that due process is followed. By allowing Neighbors to proceed as it did, the
District Court essentially condoned the filing of a complaint ( for declaratory relief) which neither
named nor was served on the parties sought to be affected thereby. The Powderhom Peninsula
encompasses nearly 3,000 acres and consists of approximately 186 parcels of property. No owner
of any property encompassed by the subject amendment objected to inclusion in the same. All
owners of property included in the Powderhom Peninsula, not just the Appellants hereto, were
benefitted by the Board's Decision. Yet the District Court has allowed Neighbors to short circuit
the litigation process, and to essentially run afoul of due process guarantees, by including a
declaratory judgment claim in an administrative appeal and proceeding directly to entry of a
judgment that impairs the rights of interested parties who were neither named nor served in the
action. To that end, the Court's application of its interpretation of the holding in Price was
erroneous.
In addition, even if it was procedurally proper for the District Court to resolve a declaratory
judgment action in the context of an administrative appeal, thereby affecting the rights of persons
not made parties, then the District Court nonetheless erred based upon its interpretation of the case
holding. To this end, Appellants Magnuson respectfully incorporate and assert herein the argument
advanced by Appellants Powderhorn in their Opening Brief at pp. 21-24.
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C.

Neighbors Did Not Timely Appeal the Board's Final Order of November 16,
2006.

If the Board's final Order of Decision of November 16, 2006 was in fact appealable nuder
the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A), a point not conceded, then Neighbors nonetheless failed
to timely appeal. The time within which an "affected person" may appeal a final agency action is
twenty-eight (28) days. See I. C. §67-6521 (1 )(d). Appellants Magnuson incorporate herein as though
set forth in full the argument and authority advanced by the Powderhom Appellants at pp. 24-25 of
their Opening Brief in support of the contention that Neighbors failed to timely appeal the Board's
final Order of Decision of November 16, 2006 as required by LC. §67-652l(l)(d).
In addition, Appellants Magnuson note the following additional reasons that support the
conclusion that Neighbors' Petition for Review was procedurally and jurisdictionally defective and
untimely. Neighbors' Petition for Review purported to create subject matter jurisdiction under
applicable provisions ofldaho Code §67-6521 (LLUPA) and Idaho Code §§67-5270 through 675277 (IDAP A). R., Vol. I, p. 2. In addition, Neighbors specifically alleged that the Petition for
Review was made subject to the provisions ofIRCP 84. Id.
IRCP 84(b) requires that a party filing a Petition for Judicial Review "concurrently serve
copies of the Notice of Petition for Judicial Review upon the agency ... and all other parties to the
proceeding before the agency.... " (Emphasis added.) Proof of service "on all parties" shall be filed
with the Court in the form required by IRCP 5(f).
While Appellants Powderhom and Magnuson intervened notwithstanding the fact that they
were never served by Neighbors, there is no evidence that the other parties to the requested
amendment (Charles Blakeley, Eastpoint Farms, Inc., or Bla Bar, Inc.), or any other owner of
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property on the Powderhom Peninsula, were ever served or that any proof of service was ever filed.
Under IRCP 4(a)(2), the time for effecting service is six (6) months after the filing of the
action. Appellants Magnuson argued to the District Court that the six (6) month period following
the filing of the Petition for Review had passed and that dismissal of the action was appropriate as
to all other parties who had previously appeared in proceedings before the County. CR, Vol. II, p.
426. Failure to comply with the service requirements of Rules 4(a)(2), 5(f), and 84(b), mandates
dismissal of the action. See, ll¾, Hincks v. Neilson, 137 Idaho 610, 51 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2002).
Appellants Magnuson further argued, given the jurisdictional time frame involved under
LLUPA and IDAPA (twenty-eight (28) days), that the action, once dismissed, could not be
reinstituted or reinitiated as to parties who appeared before the County but who had not been
formally or properly served with process. In other words, all parties to the proceedings before the
County (other than Powderhom and Magnuson), having neither been named nor served in
compliance with Rule 84(b ), were entitled to have Neighbors' Petition for Review dismissed. While
said dismissal would be without prejudice, it would effectively end the action as to those parties, and
moot Neighbors' challenge, since the action could not thereafter be reinitiated in a manner compliant
with the twenty-eight (28) day time frame mandated by LLUPA and IDAPA.
Notwithstanding the reasons advanced above, and the seemingly unambiguous and clear
application of the cited rules, the District Court wholly ignored the argument and failed to address
the same. This was in error.
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D.

The District Court Erred in Allowing Neighbors to Amend its Petitiou for
Judicial Review.
1.

The District Court Erroneously Allowed Neighbors' Ameuded Petitiou
for Judicial Review to Seek Review of the Board's Final Order of
November 16, 2006.

The Powderhorn Appellants, at pp. 25-26 of their Opening Brief, have set forth argument and
authority supporting the proposition that the District Court erroneously allowed Neighbors to amend
its Petition for Judicial Review so as to encompass the November 16, 2006 final Order of Decision
of the Board. Those arguments and authorities are incorporated herein as though set forth in full.
Neighbors' Petition for Review, having been joined with a responsive pleadings, could not be
amended absent leave of the Court. The amendment, even though ultimately authorized by the
Court, could not "relate back" so as to revive an untimely appeal given that Neighbors did not timely
seek judicial review of the final Board Decision ofNovember 16, 2006 within twenty-eight (28) days
thereafter.

2.

The District Court Erroneously Allowed Neighbors' Amended Petition
for Judicial Review to Include a Claim for Declaratory Relief.

In addition to its untimely attempt to seek judicial review of the Board's November 16, 2006
final Order of Decision, Neighbors' Amended Petition for Review sought to add a claim for
declaratory relief. This was improper. In allowing the filing of the Amended Petition for Review,
so as to include a claim for declaratory relief, the District Court erred.
Different evidentiary standards and burdens ofproof apply when the District Court sits as an
appellate court as opposed to a court of original jurisdiction. The Petition for Judicial Review
required that the District Court act in its appellate capacity. As such, that review, assuming
jurisdiction existed, was to be limited to the matters properly included in the record. Specific
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statutory and procedural authorities limit a party's ability to place extraneous materials into the
record for consideration on appeal. See IRCP 84(1) and LC. §§67-5276 and 67-5277.

In any and all event, a motion to present additional evidence must be timely made (within
twenty-one (21) days of filing of the transcript and record), and it must be supported by affidavit
evidence as to why the materials were not included in the record in the first place. See LC. §675276. Neither requirement was met in this case. Nonetheless, Neighbors sought to place materials
before the Court, in a wholly improper manner, as unswom attachments to an Amended Petition for
Review. Said efforts, ostensibly made by Neighbors in support of their declaratory judgment claim,
nonetheless improperly placed materials before a Court sitting in its appellate capacity.
Given the divergent evidentiary standards, and the divergent standards for admissible proof,
the Magnuson Appellants submitted that it was procedurally improper, under the facts at bar, to
allow for the joinder of a claim for declaratory relief with a claim for appellate review. R., Vol. II,
p. 427. This is not to say that Neighbors could not, should they so desire, advance a claim for
declaratory relief in a separate proceeding. This Court has acknowledged the availability of such a
remedy. See Burt v. City ofidaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 66,665 P.2d 1075 (1983).
While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject to direct judicial
review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral action such as
declaratory actions.... In such instances, the decision will not be disturbed absent a
clear showing that it is confiscutory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
Burt v. City ofidaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 66 (citations omitted). By referring to such an avenue of
relief as "collateral," it is suggested that this Court implicitly (if not explicitly) acknowledge the
impropriety of including the two claims (for appellate review and declaratory relief) in the same
proceeding. Should Neighbors choose to initiate such a proceeding, they will be held to the weighty
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evidentiary standards therein. Further, IRCP 84 will not apply. Should Neighbors seek a stay of any
further proceedings before the County with respect to the Powderhorn Peninsula, then Neighbors
would be subject to the requirements ofIRCP 65, including the necessity of posting an undertaking.
Those protections were virtually ignored by the District Court in this case when it enjoined the
parties to the proceeding (Kootenai County and the Powderhorn and Magnuson Appellants) others
not even made parties thereto.

E.

The District Court Erred in Vacating and Remandiug the Board's Final Order
of November 16, 2006 Pursuant to IRCP 67-5279.

At pp. 27-36 of their Opening Brief, the Powderhom Appellants set forth argument and
authority in support of each of the following propositions:
(1)

The Board's final Order of November 16, 2006 did not violate Idaho Code
§67-5279(3);

(2)

The issue of compliance with LC. §67-6509 should not have been addressed
on appeal to the District Court since it was never raised before the County
Board;

(3)

The Board complied with all of the requirements of!daho Code §67-6509(b);
and

(4)

The Board's final Order did not prejudice any ofNeighbors' substantial rights
as required pursuant to LC. §67-5279(4).

Appellants Magnuson incorporate herein as though set forth in full the argument and authority
advanced by Appellants Powderhorn in support of the foregoing propositions at pp. 27-37 of their
Opening Brief.
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F.

The District Court Erred by Staying Further Proceedings Before the County on
any Requested Zone Changes to the Powderhorn Peninsula Without Posting
Adequate Security.

Shortly after filing its initial Petition for Judicial Review, and without serving the same on
all interested parties in proceedings before the County Board, as required by IRCP 84, Neighbors
moved for entry of a stay. R., Vol. I, pp. 27-33. Neighbors sought a stay as to any request for
rezoning that may thereafter be made by Powderhom Peninsula property owners, Powderhom
Communities, LLC, Blakeley, EastpointFarms, Inc., Magnuson, Coeur d'Alene Land Company, and
Bia Bar, Inc. Id.
At the request of Neighbors, the District Court granted the motion, ordering as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioners motion for a stay be, and it is
hereby granted and that Respondent Kootenai County is stayed from conducting the
scheduled public hearing on request by Powderhom Communities, LLC and others
for changes in zoning classification from Agricultural to Rural ... until such time as
the Court enters a final decision upon the Petition for Judicial Review of the change
to the Comprehensive Plan.
R., Vol. I, pp. 94-95 (emphasis added). No security of any kind was required by the Court as a
condition of entry of the Order.
The Order granting the stay was in error for two reasons. First, as noted, the Order failed to
require that Neighbors post an adequate undertaking as a condition of the stay. For the reasons
advanced by Appellants Powderhom at pp. 37-38 of their Opening Brief(which are incorporated
herein), the District Court erred.
Second, the District Court's Order was in error in that it effectively enjoined individuals and
entities from pursuing rezoning before Kootenai County without those individuals having first been
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named in or served with the Petition for Judicial Review. IRCP 84(b) requires that a Petition for
Judicial Review be concurrently served upon "all other parties to the proceeding before the
agency .... " While Appellants Powderhom and Magnuson were neither named nor served, they
intervened. No other property owner did so. Yet the order effectively operated as a stay of action
as to all property owners on Powderhom Peninsula (not limited to the Powderhom and Magnuson
Appellants) even though those parties had no prior notice or opportunity to participate or be heard
in the proceedings. To the extent that such parties were enjoined, the District Court's Order violates
fundamental concepts of procedural and substantive due process.

G.

The District Court's Memorandum Opinion, to the Extent Predicated Upon
Neighbors' Claim for Declaratory Relief, Violates Due Process.

The Powderhom Peninsula consists of approximately 186 parcels ofreal property, only some
of which are owned by Appellants Powderhorn and Magnuson. Yet Neighbors didn't seek to just
void the Order ofDecision, through a declaratory judgment action, as to Powderhorn and Magnuson.
Neighbors sought to void the Order in its entirety, without regard as to the individuals to whom it
applied.
As noted throughout, the foregoing underscores the incongruity of joining a declaratory
judgment claim with a Petition for Review. No service was had of a summons issued on a complaint
asserting a claim within the District Court's original subject matter jurisdiction. While Powderhorn
and Magnuson intervened, no other Peninsula property owner was afforded notice of the proceeding.
The Court erred to the extent it proceeded to enter final judgment on a claim for declaratory relief
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determining the rights of parties not provided with notice or an opportunity to be heard. For those
reasons, the Court's final judgment violates traditional notions of due process.

H.

Appellants Magnuson are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on
Appeal.

Appellants Magnuson are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal
pursuant to I. C. § 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Appellants Magnuson incorporate
the argument and authorities advanced by Appellants Powderhorn in support of said claim at pp. 3940 of their Opening Brief.

IV.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants H. F. Magnuson and

Coeur d'Alene Land Company respectfully request that this Court affirm the Kootenai County Board
of Commissioners' final Order of Decision ofNovember 16, 2006 and award Appellants Magnuson
their reasonable attorney fees and costs as incurred herein.
Dated this

/tl~ay of March, 2008.

ey for Appellants/
enors
Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H.F. Magnuson
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